UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 3 "Law As . . .": Theory and Method in Legal
History

Article 10

9-2011

The Historical Consciousness of the Resistant
Subject
Norman W. Spaulding
Stanford

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Legal History Commons
Recommended Citation
Norman W. Spaulding, The Historical Consciousness of the Resistant Subject, 1 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 677 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol1/iss3/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.

Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete)

2/22/2012 9:07 AM

The Historical Consciousness of the
Resistant Subject
Norman W. Spaulding*
I. À la place de la Révolution ........................................................................................ 677
II. A “revolution in knowledge worthy of the name of Copernicus” .................... 678
III. Avoiding Resistance ................................................................................................. 681
IV. Resistance “time out of mind” ............................................................................... 687
V. Counterhistory ............................................................................................................ 689

I. À LA PLACE DE LA RÉVOLUTION
The first scene always includes a shot of the corpus delicti. And it is the first
scene, quite irrespective of where it appears in the sequence. Of course, the face is
not always depicted, the head not always beheld as Macbeth’s before the curtain,
or Louis XVI’s before the throng in what theretofore had been La Place Louis
XV. Indeed, the body need not be that of a noble, need not be real, need not even
be an immediately identifiable individual, though identity is always put in question
by the scene, always assigned. Our gaze may be carried up from a trail of blood, a
limb out of joint, or down the bloodied wall of a room that could be our own; it
may be fixed photographically, trained on the ghastly appearance of an entire
corpse in situ, hanging distended from a tree, or burning in effigy; it may pan
down slowly, forensically, from a mound of freshly dug soil to the familiar hole,
empty or full, but in either case far too massive and misshapen for a single grave;
finally, it may be made to linger on the trace of the body removed. And even when
both body and trace are missing, the first scene will be haunted by that absence, as
by the ghost in Hamlet, or suspended as a scene of redemptive death to come for
which we are invited to wait, and to long. At the limit of suspension, the
redemptive death we await, the one for which we are enjoined proleptically to
long, is none other than our own.
This first scene—not the murder itself, but the scene of death—marks the
* Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Christopher Tomlins, Robert
Gordon, Ariela Gross, Amalia Kessler, Dan Edelstein, Ian Haney Lopez, Hilary Schor, Nomi
Stolzenberg, Kurt Shaw, and the participants and commentators at the UC Irvine School of Law
“‘Law As . . .’: Theory and Method in Legal History” symposium (Apr. 16–17, 2010).
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appearance of the resistant subject. The distinctive feature of the first scene and its
repeated representations is that the death it calls to mind cannot be ascribed to
fate, the will of God, or the necessities of any state of nature. Nothing about
replacing the guillotine at La Place de la Concorde with the obscure obelisk from
the Luxor Temple in 1836 concealed the human agency behind Louis XVI’s
decapitation and the prior destruction of the statue honoring his grandfather à La
Place de la Révolution. Though the hieroglyphs engraved on the obelisk honoring
Amun-Ra and the long reign of the pharaoh Rameses II (whose body now
remains on display, preserved intactus, at the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities)
surely tempt us to forget the scene of death and the terrible responsibility which
belong to us alone.1
We recall this first scene, rewrite it, bowdlerize it, substitute it, dream it, and
above all, try to forget it over and over, not only to condemn, to contain, and, as
the case may be, to inspire revolutionary and counter-revolutionary acts of
resistance, but to mediate countless more mundane, bloodless repetitions of
resistance, lawful and otherwise. It is the scene of resistance. Memory, history, and
law are constantly engaged not only to justify our imagination of this scene, but to
end it, and to eliminate the evidence of it. The scene of the dead sovereign, which
in modernity is always also the scene of the dead self, not only marks the
appearance of the resistant subject, but frames that subject’s historical
consciousness.
II. A “REVOLUTION IN KNOWLEDGE WORTHY OF THE NAME OF COPERNICUS”2
It may seem strange to speak of the “historical consciousness” of the
resistant subject. After all, Freud’s resistant subject is defined by a certain
mnemonic incapacity. Resistance, Freud explains in The Interpretation of Dreams, is a
kind of censor that relies upon transference, displacement, inversion,
overdetermination, etc., to conceal unconscious dream-thoughts in dreamcontent.3 And resistance induces the betrayal of memory, producing not only
“fragmentary,” but “positively inaccurate and falsified”4 waking memories of what
we have dreamed.5 “Doubt whether a dream or certain of its details have been

1. See MUSÉE CARNAVALET, DE LA PLACE LOUIS XV À LA PLACE DE LA CONCORDE 112–
17 (1982); SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 668–71, 674,
748–50 (1989); ROBERT SOLÉ, LE GRAND VOYAGE DE L’OBÉLISQUE (2004). The obelisk’s original
cap was stolen in the sixth century B.C.; the current gold cap was installed by the French in 1998 to
mark the visit of the now deposed President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. See id. at 239.
2. JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS: A SELECTION 114 (Alan Sheridan trans., Tavistock Publications
1977) [hereinafter A SELECTION]. See also JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS 334 (Bruce Fink trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 2006) [hereinafter ÉCRITS].
3. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 174–75, 340–46 (James Strackey
ed. & trans., Avon Books 1965) (1990) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS].
4. Id. at 550.
5. See id. at 580–81.
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correctly reported,” he writes, “is once more a derivative of the dream-censorship,
of resistance to the penetration of the dream-thoughts into consciousness. This
resistance has not been exhausted even by the displacements and substitutions it
has brought about; it persists in the form of doubt attaching to the material which
has been allowed through.”6 The resistant subject not only suffers bouts of
amnesia, forgets what was dreamt altogether, but doubts even what she does
remember.
At least in Freud’s early writing, the subject must be made to remember. The
work of analysis consists in opening the subject’s access to the historical
consciousness resistance refuses. As Lacan explains, “the condition of the
continuity in the anamnesis, by which Freud measures the completeness of the
cure . . . is not a question of biological memory, nor of its intuitionist
mystification, nor of the paramnesia of the symptom, but of remembering, that is, of
history.”7 This suggests that resistance must be overcome in order to address the
subject’s symptoms. Tellingly though, it is resistance itself that offers the analyst a
way in. So it would be more accurate to say that resistance must be addressed in
order to overcome the subject’s symptoms.8
As we already know . . . a complete reversal of all psychical values takes
place between the dream-thoughts and the dream. . . . If, then, an
indistinct element of a dream’s content is in addition attacked by doubt,
we have a sure indication that we are dealing with a comparatively direct
derivative of one of the proscribed dream-thoughts. The state of things is
what it was after some sweeping revolution in one of the republics of
antiquity or the Renaissance. The noble and powerful families which had
previously dominated the scene were sent into exile and all the high
offices were filled by newcomers. Only the most impoverished and
powerless members of the vanquished families, or their remote
dependents, were allowed to remain in the city; and even so they did not
enjoy full civic rights and were viewed with distrust. The distrust in this
analogy corresponds to the doubt in the case we are considering. . . . It is
precisely the fact that doubt produces this interrupting effect upon an

6. Id. at 554 (citation omitted). See also id. at 555 (“The forgetting of dreams, too, remains
inexplicable unless the power of the psychical censorship is taken into account.”).
7. ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 213; see also id. at 217 (“What we teach the subject to recognize as
his unconscious is his history. . . .”); id. at 215 (discussing analyst’s methodological attention to
“monuments,” “archival documents,” “semantic evolution,” “traditions,” and “traces”); id. at 335
(“[T]heir function presupposed history at its very core, their discipline being the one that had
reconstructed the bridge between modern man and ancient myths.”).
8. As Lacan puts it, “The resistances themselves . . . are used as long as possible in the
direction [sens] of the progress of the discourse. And when it is time to put an end to them, we
manage to do so by giving in to them.” Id. at 249–50. Compare Lacan’s discussion of resistance,
censorship and law, in JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK II, at 127
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Sylvana Tomaselli trans., 1988) [hereinafter SEMINARS, BOOK II].
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analysis that reveals it as a derivative and tool of psychic resistance.
Psychoanalysis is justly suspicious. One of its rules is that whatever
interrupts the progress of analytic work is resistance.9
Resistance not only lights the path of analysis, following Freud’s striking analogy,
it appears à la place de la révolution. This scene, the place of liberation now
haunted by survivors of the ancien régime, is the scene of distrust and self-doubt
that cannot be avoided. Is it possible to approach L’Obélisque de Louxor and its
hieroglyphs à La Place de la Concorde free of confusion, doubt, uncertainty? Is it
possible to avoid imagining the guillotine? The missing head? The following
terror?10
The problem for the resistant subject is not, then, any mnemonic incapacity,
but rather that she remembers far too much, wants memory more than anything,
and is on account of that excess of memory, as Nietzsche well understood,
obliged to forget.11 The dream work of the resistant subject—her repeated
displacements, forgetting, confusion, and doubt—is itself a kind of memory work,
memory working, reaching for consciousness, simultaneously reconstructing and
quailing at falsifications of the first scene. Analysis does not confer historical
consciousness on this view. Rather, analysis is possible only because the resistant
subject is already entrenched in historical consciousness, already remembering,
already overwhelmed by memory.
This is to state what Lacan insisted was a Copernican revolution in Freud’s
theory of psychoanalysis. If resistance cannot be overcome, if the internal division
resistance reveals is irreducible, if we cannot, as Freud admits, pierce what he
called “the dream’s navel,”12 analysis may mitigate certain symptoms, but the
specific historical consciousness underlying both the Enlightenment and the
Reformation is undone. A project whose trajectory is self-mastery leads to the
paradoxical discovery that “man is a decentered subject,”13 that the subject no
9. INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS, supra note 3, at 554 – 55.
10. A parallel set of questions could of course be posed regarding the history of the American
Revolution and ex post resistance running to civil war and touching upon the most basic
constitutional failure of the nation (failure based on an illicit division, it should go without saying, in
the very constitution of legal subjects). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.1;
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. Is it possible, we might ask, to approach the Constitution free of doubt,
confusion, distrust, and uncertainty? Do the Reconstruction Amendments, ratified under the
politically and legally strained circumstances prevailing after the Civil War, resolve or deepen those
doubts? Do they redeem the liberal subject or mark the liberal subject as already dead? See Norman
W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective
Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003). On the terror in France, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A
CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, ch. 17 (1989); DAN EDELSTEIN, THE TERROR OF
NATURAL RIGHT (2009).
11. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
HISTORY FOR LIFE (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1874).
12. INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS, supra note 3, at 564.
13. SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 47. See ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 355 (“[I]t is in the
disintegration of the imaginary unity constituted by the ego that the subject finds the signifying
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more revolves about the ego than the sun and solar system about the earth.
Just to start raising the question as to what the ego is requires one to
detach oneself from what we might call the religious conception of
consciousness. Implicitly, modern man thinks that everything which has
happened in the universe since its origin came about so as to converge on
this thing which thinks . . . unique, precious being, pinnacle of creation,
which is himself, with this privileged vantage-point called consciousness.
This perspective leads to an anthropomorphism which is so deluded that
one has to start by shedding the scales from one’s eyes, so as to realize
what kind of illusion one has fallen prey to.14
But detachment from this religious conception of consciousness underlying the
Enlightenment project is itself resisted. We want self-mastery. So as soon as the
scales are shed, both subject and analyst are predisposed to forget precisely what has
been revealed. In his later work, “Freud chose to remind us that the unconscious
as such cannot be reached and makes itself known in a fashion which is
paradoxical, painful, and cannot be reduced to the pleasure principle. He thus
brings back into the foreground the essence of his discovery, which we tend to
forget.”15 It is not enough to disassemble the guillotine or rename the scene—we
substitute hieroglyphs in their place, inviting amnesia. Anything to avoid Freud’s
discovery of decentered, resistant subjects and the death instinct in the seemingly
inexhaustible repetition of traumatic experience. Anything à la place de la
révolution.
III. AVOIDING RESISTANCE
This is the position not only of the resistant subject and her analyst, but of
material of his symptoms.”). This is what Lacan calls Freud’s “revolution in knowledge worthy of the
name of Copernicus.” A SELECTION, supra note 2, at 114.
14. SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 47–48. See ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 250 (“But you
cannot possibly [understand the meaning of the subject’s discourse] if you cleave to the idea that the
subject’s ego is identical to the presence that is speaking to you.”).
15. SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 65 (emphasis added). Freud’s theory, Lacan
elsewhere writes,
constitutes an objection to any reference to totality in the individual, since the subject
introduces division therein, as well as in the collectivity that is the equivalent of the
individual. Psychoanalysis is what clearly relegates both the one and the other to the status of mirages.
This would seem to be something that could no longer be forgotten, were it not precisely psychoanalysis that
teaches us that it is forgettable—confirmation of which turns out . . . to come from
psychoanalysts themselves, their ‘new tendencies’ representing this forgetting.
ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 242 (emphasis added). Lacan was writing against the tradition of egopsychology. He accused his colleagues of having forgotten the central insights of Freud, most
fundamentally the linguistic structure of the unconscious—and he was “excommunicated” for it. See
LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYSCHO-ANALYSIS 1–13 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
1977) [hereinafter FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS]; see also SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 65;
id. at 228 (“There is only one resistance, the resistance of the analyst. The analyst resists when he
doesn’t understand what he is dealing with.”).
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modern political philosophy, legal thought, and, to a certain extent, history.
Predicated as it is on the myth of consent veiled beyond history in a so-called state
of nature, modern political philosophy cannot address the resistant subject.
Revolution and resistance are reduced to exceptional events—aberrations verging
on the ahistorical and nearly always charged with the terror of anarchy.16 Even
natural law theorists, in whom one would expect to find some degree of
insouciance regarding the defiance of law, solemnly burden the “right” of civil
disobedience with elaborate preconditions no ordinary resistant subject could
meet.17
A few contemporary theorists have insisted that political philosophy begin
from the position of the resistant subject. But they generally seek either to liberate
the subject from her resistant position (typically by demanding the standard
accoutrement of liberal subjects), or to abjure the normative dimension of political
philosophy, shifting to a kind of melancholic documentary mode perfectly
matched to the malaise of the subordinated identity groups they depict. Resistance
is represented, alternatingly, as futile, as a merely reactive stance, as everywhere
and nowhere, or as a form of interpretive action more or less cabined on the
knowledge side of the power/knowledge circuit.18 We are, in the end, instructed in
our underlying desire to be punished, our attachment to injury and subjection, and
the naivety and embarrassing (indeed, totalitarian) implications of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century revolutionary ideologies.19 Politics, the normative dimension of
which is supposed to inspire public sacrifice, reduces to base forms of selfsacrifice (docility and suicide, even suicide bombing) or the justification and
critique of forced sacrifice for others (oppression, exclusion, war, and now
chillingly plural holocausts). In neither case may the resistant subject apprehend

16. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (Thomas Cook ed., Hafner Press 1973) (1690); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
363 – 77 (1971). Not just revolution or resistance, but participation, is diminished by other modern
political theorists. On Joseph Schumpeter’s reduction of participation to voting and the influence of
his ideas on Berelson, Dahl, Sartori, and Eckstein, see CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4 – 13 (1970).
17. Above all, self-interested resistance is precluded. See HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE
REPUBLIC (1972); HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1965); see also WILLIAM SIMON, THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998).
18. See JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER (1997); CHARLES MILLS, THE
RACIAL CONTRACT (1997); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Judith Butler,
Subjection, Resistance, Resignification: Between Freud and Foucault, in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION 229–50
(John Rajchman ed., 1995). On the effort to liberate the subject from her resistant position through
liberal contract theory, see Charles Mills, The Domination Contract, in CONTRACT & DOMINATION 79–
105 (Carole Pateman & Charles Mills eds., 2007).
19. See, for example, Wendy Brown’s lacerating discussion of “contemporary political
projects” directed at “emancipatory political aims,” in STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN
LATER MODERNITY ix (1995); id. at 7 (noting the manner in which “ideals of freedom . . . emerge to
vanquish their imagined enemies, but in this move . . . frequently recycle and reinstate rather than
transform the terms of domination that generated them”).
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herself as decentered and act.20
The resistant subject is equally anathema to legal thought. Constitutions
more or less immediately replace revolutions, citizens (or rather abstractions about
citizenship) replace resistant subjects, and the rule of law approximates religious
ritual.21 Obelisk. Hieroglyph. Exegetical obsession. Monumental history. Law a
civic religion. Lawlessness a breach of faith. There is interminable debate about
the location of interpretive authority, about whose exegetical work is dispositive
(judges, lawyers, legislators, executives, citizens), but the methods of interpretation
(structural, textualist, originalist, purposivist) and the means of asserting
interpretive authority (political expression, democratically accountable legislative
action, bureaucratic mediation, and “adversarial legalism”22) remain circumscribed
within boundaries set by law.
Popular constitutionalism decentralizes interpretive authority, moving it
from bench and bar to the citizen subject.23 And it demonstrates quite
provocatively that ordinary legal processes cannot in fact contain the means of
asserting interpretive authority. (Most strikingly in the American context, the
Constitution is regularly “amended” without resort to the process Article V sets
out, and, when necessary, by raw force.) But the demonstration is riddled with
anxiety, with a desire to reduce extra-legal means to the legal process, to show that
irreducibly extra-legal means are nevertheless orderly, or at least oriented toward
law, and, of course, to avoid the twin spectres of anarchy and tyranny. This anxiety
is the first clue that even popular constitutionalists are not in fact concerned with
resistant subjects. Their objective is not to address resistance but rather to affirm

20. Even Bonnie Honig, who turns most promisingly to an agonistic conception of politics
that does not relegate resistance to a revolutionary founding, who sees the folly in resistance strategies
that seek merely to expand the rights of liberal subjects, and who is unafraid of “rupture” and of
“democracy’s self-overcoming,” is reluctant to admit and fully explore the question of agonism
internal to the subject. BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS (2009); see also WILLIAM
CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE (1991). I am otherwise in deep sympathy with Honig’s account
of the paradox of politics and most grateful to Christopher Tomlins for pointing out the connection.
See BROWN, supra note 19, at 21–22 (naming a parallel “paradox” of resistance to power).
21. See HONIG, supra note 20, at 26–28, 32–33; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 11–14 (1988); Joseph Story, Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffock Bar, in THE LEGAL
MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 70–71 (Perry Miller ed., 1961).
22. The term is Robert Kagan’s. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3–4
(2001). On the methodological and normative oscillations of American legal thought, see generally
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870 – 1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 – 505
(1996).
23. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 7 – 8 (2004); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS x (1999); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE 21, 91, 272–73 (1991) (describing “dualist” theory of constitutional interpretation and
amendment); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, Part II passim (2000)
(discussing historical evidence of “dualist” theory in relation to the constitutional turmoil of the Civil
War and Reconstruction).
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the sovereignty of the citizen subject, surtout à la place de la révolution.24
As psychoanalytic theory suggests, history can address resistance, both
individual and collective, by taking memory seriously. But historians have come
late indeed to the question of memory, obsessed as they have been with the
objective implications of the interdependence of law, history, and national identity.
Hegel gave the most direct and enduring statement of that interdependence in his
Lectures on the Philosophy of History: “Only in a State cognizant of laws,” he argued,
“can distinct transactions take place, accompanied by such a clear consciousness
of them as supplies the ability and suggests the necessity of an enduring record.”25
Families and clans have subjective memory, but only the nation-state offers the
conditions in which history may be written:
Family memorials, patriarchal traditions, have an interest confined to the
family and the clan. The uniform course of events which such a condition
implies, is no subject of serious remembrance; though distinct
transactions or turns of fortune, may rouse Mnemosyne to form
conceptions of them—in the same way as love and the religious emotions
provoke imagination to give shape to a previously formless impulse. But
it is the State which first presents subject-matter that is not only adapted
to the prose of History, but involves the production of such history in
the very progress of its own being.26
For anyone accustomed to thinking about law and history in terms of the ways in
which the rule of law (especially the interpretive work of the courts) depends upon
and reflects certain assumptions about the past, certain historiographic
conventions, or the ways in which social and political history draw into relief
contingent developments in the law, the claim that there can be no history without
law must surely come as something of a surprise.
But as Hayden White, interpreting Hegel, explains,
[w]here there is no rule of law, there can be neither a subject nor the kind
of event that lends itself to narrative representation. . . . [N]arrativity . . .
presupposes the existence of a legal system against which or on behalf of
which the typical agents of a narrative account militate. And this raises
the suspicion that narrative in general, from the folktale to the novel,
from the annals to the fully realized “history,” has to do with the topics
of law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority.27

24. See HONIG, supra note 20, at 23 – 24 (revealing the Kantian underpinnings of deliberative
democracy’s hesitant endorsement of popular sovereignty); KRAMER, supra note 23, at 33 – 35.
25. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 61 (J. Sibree
trans., Dover Publications 1956) (1837).
26. Id. at 60–61.
27. HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM 12–13 (1987). “If, as Hegel suggests,
historicality as a distinct mode of human existence is unthinkable without the presupposition of a
system of law in relation to which a specifically legal subject could be constituted, then historical self-
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History needs the legal subject to “serve as the agent, agency, and subject of
historical narrative.”28 Moreover, it is simply not possible to narrate events
without turning to law and moralizing, for “every fully realized story . . . is a kind
of allegory.”29 To narrate is to “endow[ ] events, whether real or imaginary, with a
significance that they do not possess as a mere sequence.”30 And “every historical
narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events of
which it treats.”31 Narrative form works to bridge the gap between events and the
normative order promised or imagined by law. Historical narrative, specifically,
targets the real, “makes the real desirable, makes the real into an object of desire,
and does so by its imposition, upon events that are represented as real, of the
formal coherency that stories possess.”32 No history without law.
What then of history when the authority of law is contested, fractured, not
just to the point of conceptual disagreement, but of social disorder, to the point of
open resistance, revolution, fratricidal violence, constitutional failure? And what to
make of White’s seemingly contradictory thesis that historical discourse only arises
when more than one account of the real is possible? “In order to qualify as
historical,” he insists, “an event must be susceptible to at least two narrations of
its occurrence. Unless at least two versions of the same set of events can be
imagined, there is no reason for the historian to take upon himself the authority of
giving the true account of what really happened.”33
If, as this rather powerfully suggests, resistance is the domain of historical
discourse, why put history in relation to law at all? White contends that historical
discourse is intimately, indeed, formally, bound up with the maintenance of legal
authority—and all the more so when that authority is contested.
Where there is ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the status of the legal
system . . . the form in which the subject encounters most immediately
the social system in which he is enjoined to achieve a full humanity, the
ground on which any closure of a story one might wish to tell about a
past, whether it be a public or a private past, is lacking.34
And it is just such moments of resistance that produce the most anxiety, and,
concomitantly, the most aggressive narrative efforts to provide the missing closure
we crave—to mend history, and in so doing, protect, re-establish, or legitimize the

consciousness, the kind of consciousness capable of imagining the need to represent reality as history,
is conceivable only in terms of its interest in law, legality, and legitimacy, and so on.” Id. at 13 – 14.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id. at 14. “Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that
morality or a moralizing impulse is present too.” Id. at 24. “A narrative account is always a figurative
account, an allegory.” Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 21.
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id. at 14.
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system of law that would otherwise be threatened.35 History centers the subject,
offers order à la place de la révolution.36
At the limit of the desire for closure and order, Clio surrenders to Nomos.
History, now firmly in the hands of philosophy, becomes law: Hegel’s dialectic and
Reason in History;37 Marx’s species-being and economic determinism;38 Comte’s
positivism and loi des trois états;39 and Spencer’s “Progress: Its Law and its
Cause.”40 Even sober, post-Hegelian efforts to “discipline” history,41 to
professionalize the field, remove it from political, and especially utopian,
imagination, nevertheless surrender it to law, here as a concealed (which is to say,
objective, neutral, empirically verifiable) plot:
Insofar as historical stories can be completed, can be given narrative
closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they give to reality the
odor of the ideal. This is why the plot of a historical narrative is always an
embarrassment and has to be presented as “found” in the events rather
than put there by narrative techniques.42
With Lacan, then, we might say that modern historians have had as much trouble
interrogating their own desire, understanding the sources of their own resistance,
and understanding the roots of the discipline in resistance, as have analysts.43 They
have forgotten history’s status as muse, forgotten altogether that Clio is the
offspring of one of Mnemosyne’s nine nights with Zeus.44

35. See id. at 30.
36. “[T]his value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a
desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure, of an image of life that
is and can only be imaginary. The notion that sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of
the stories we tell about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, daydreams, reveries.”
Id. at 24.
37. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY (Robert S. Hartman ed. &
trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1953).
38. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 66
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
39. AUGUSTE COMTE, DISCOURS SUR L’ESPRIT POSITIF, ch. 1 (1844).
40. WHITE, supra note 27, at 61 – 63.
41. Id. at 61.
42. Id. at 21; see also id. at 62, 65.
43. “[W]hat is the analyst’s desire? What must there be in the analyst’s desire for it to operate
in a correct way? Can this question be left outside the limits of our field, as it is in effect in the
sciences—the modern sciences of the most assured type—where no one questions himself as to what
there must be in the desire, for example, of the physicist? There really must be a series of crises for an
Oppenheimer to question us all as to what there is in the desire that lies at the basis of modern
physics. . . . In any case, the analyst’s desire can in no way be left outside our question . . . .” FOUR
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, supra note 15, at 9–10.
44. See APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 7 (Keith Aldrich trans.,
1975) (by Mnemosyne Zeus had Calliope, Clio, Melpomene, Euterpe, Erato, Terpsichore, Urania,
Thalia, and Polymia—nine muses of the arts).
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IV. RESISTANCE “TIME OUT OF MIND”
White, following Arendt, dates the surrender of history to law, revealingly,
with the “linkage of history and politics in those ideologies that took shape in the
wake of the French Revolution.”45 But the entanglement of the two stretches back
to pre-revolutionary efforts to place law beyond history altogether. As J.G.A.
Pocock has argued:
If it is no longer as certain as it once was that the extension of
monarchical authority and the reception of Roman law went everywhere
hand in hand, the fact remains that the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries were throughout western Europe a time of collision between
the authority of kings and local or national privileges, liberties and
constitutions. Many of these latter were rooted in feudal custom, some
could even be dimly traced back to the customs of the Germanic invaders
of the empire, and all were more or less permeated by the essential
medieval idea of law as a thing ancient, immanent and unmade, proof
against invasion by human wills because no will had made it. Since there
was an increasing tendency to claim sovereignty in the full sense for the
king, it was natural that those who sought to defend threatened privileges
or liberties should emphasize in return that their rights were rooted in a
law which no king could invade.46
Pocock locates the practice first with French jurists and their humanist critique of
the medieval approach to Roman law during the French Wars of Religion.
Medieval jurists looked almost exclusively to Roman law and to its accumulated
interpretive gloss; the humanists rejected the gloss, pressed for return to the
original text itself, and developed techniques for setting that text in the original
“context of a reconstructed society.”47 “Inadequate, piecemeal and ad hoc their
work may have been, but the essentials of the historical method were there and
were known to be there. In this way the legal humanists came to be
historians . . . .”48
But the very obstacles to reconstructing Roman law and society revealed an
unbridgeable gap between past and present—this notwithstanding the ubiquity of
Roman law in European society. Undeterred, the French jurists turned the gap
into a chasm, questioning the authority of the Justinian Code precisely because it
was ancient law developed for and suited only to its own historical context. As
Pocock explains, “[i]n the name of a more accurate interpretation, a historical
interpretation had been formulated; and in the name of historical interpretation,

45. WHITE, supra note 27, at 62.
46. JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL
LAW 16 (1987).
47. Id. at 9–10.
48. Id. at 10.
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the relevance of the past to the present was apparently being denied. The moment
was revolutionary,” not only for the development of modern history as a discipline, a
decisive break with medieval concepts of unmediated continuity with the past, but
for its political implications.49 “[T]he tension,” Pocock emphasizes, “could not be
allowed to endure.”50
So the humanists turned to feudal custom. The appeal
from written to customary law is part of a fairly widespread reaction that
was going on in sixteenth-century juristic thought; and one of the
attractions of custom was precisely that it offered a means of escape from
the divorce of past and present threatened by the criticisms of the
historical school. Because Roman law was written and unchangeable, it
could be subjected to grammatical analysis and proved to belong to a past
state of society, but because custom was by its nature unwritten law, the
usages of the folk interpreted through the mouths of judges, it could be
argued with some plausibility that it could never become obsolete.51
Custom also offered resistant subjects a uniquely salient response to monarchical
authority, inviting repeated appeals “to ‘the ancient constitution’, [sic] of seeking
to prove that the rights it was desired to defend were immemorial and therefore
beyond the king’s power to alter or annul.”52
Sir Edward Coke, who represents the apotheosis of the political turn in the
humanist critique, situates law quite literally beyond history, “in the memory of the
people.”53 A custom “doth never become a Law to bind the people, until [sic] it
hath been tried and approved time out of mind.”54 This concept of law and the
ideas of obligation following from it (“no man ought to take it on himself to be
wiser than the laws”55) would of course deeply influence Burke’s conservative
response to the French Revolution, and Pocock is at pains to demonstrate the
historical inaccuracy of the thesis as well as the strategic limitations it contained
and the resistance it provoked in political philosophers responsible for the
development of social contract theory.56 But in seventeenth-century England it
offered a way around the overdetermination of the Norman Conquest57—what
49. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 14–15.
52. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 16. “[A] truly immemorial constitution could not be subject to
a sovereign; since a king could not be known to have founded it originally, the king now reigning
could not claim to revoke rights rooted in some ancestor’s will.” Id. at 51. See also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1975–
1976, at 72 (1997).
53. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 33.
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 35.
56. Id. at 51–52, 54 – 55; id. at 162 (Hobbes); id. at 235 – 37 (Locke); Foucault, supra note 52, at
99 (Hobbes); id at 124 (Grotius, Pufendorf).
57. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 53.
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Michel Foucault, in a set of lectures on pre-revolutionary historiography, aptly
calls a “terrible,” uniquely “painful historical” and “difficult juridical category.”58
The turn to law “time out of mind” also provided leverage to those insisting,
against the encroachments and usurpations of the king drawn into relief by the
elaboration of customary rights, that sovereignty rested with parliament.59 Before
there can be a sovereign citizen subject, or any narrative history of her nation and
identity, sovereignty itself must be decentered—Louis XV’s statue must be torn
from its pedestal before the guillotine for his grandson is erected in its place.
V. COUNTERHISTORY
Law as memory, as oral, unwritten, folklore; law driven beyond history by
memory; modern history arriving, with resistant subjects, at the first scene. Pocock
is fixed on the emergence of modern history from this pre-revolutionary period—
fixed, that is, on resistance to the Whig interpretation of history. But notice that
the interdependence of law, memory, and history in the conjunction of custom
and revolutionary politics, however contingent and errant in the period, draws
history back toward Mnemosyne. It also draws history away from both
determinism (utopian and otherwise) and the concealed plots of empiricism to the
struggles of culturally and temporally specific groups. Further, it explicitly
identifies the desire of resistant subjects for authority in “time out of mind” and,
to meet that desire, the discipline of law (philosophy, or science, as necessary).
Perhaps most significantly, it exposes the division, discord, and contradiction at
the beginning of any attempt to reconstitute the authority of law. Narratives of
consent always arrive after the first scene to represent and rename, à La Place de la
Concorde, what was missing beforehand—what has been missing “time out of
mind.”
The harder Coke et al. worked to show that the rights of Englishmen rested
in immemorial custom, the more clear the absence and ambiguity of record
evidence became, and the more charged and conflicted became debate about the
Norman Conquest. The harder François Hotman and other French jurists worked
to ground French national identity and constitutional authority in the invasion of
Gaul by the Franks and the primordial nature of their customs, the more clear and
paradoxical the fact of Roman Conquest (and imperium) became.60 In both cases,
Foucault contends, establishing “that it is no longer possible to recite a lesson in
public right whose function is to guarantee the uninterrupted nature of the
genealogy of kings and their power,” presented “the problem of what Étienne
Pasquier, who was one of Hotman’s followers, calls ‘the other succession,’ or in
58. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 110.
59. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 46, 49; see also FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 72.
60. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 15. The parallels are not exact (the breadth of English common
law made claims of custom resting in time immemorial more salient than in countries more strictly
committed to the Justinian Code).
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other words . . . [w]hat happens . . . when States do not succeed one another as [a
result of] a sort of continuity that nothing interrupts . . . ?”61 What happens, that
is, when history exposes the genesis of sovereignty in “contingency and [the]
injustice of battles”?62
Hotman would be followed by the nobiliary reaction of Boulainvilliers, by
the “bourgeois revolutionary project,” and, of course, all the while, by royalist
retrenchment.63 Pocock traces a related arc in the historiography of seventeenthcentury England.64 In both cases, the monumental history supporting the crown’s
claims of absolute sovereignty was gradually disassembled. We could say then,
with Pocock, that this was the “first great age of modern historiography,”65 and
that surely would be correct. But Foucault’s use of the term “counterhistory”66
better captures the “inevitably partisan”67 purposes of the resistant subjects
responsible for these histories and the structures of resistance in which they
emerged:
The idea of revolution, which runs through the entire political workings
of the West and the entire history of the West for more than two
hundred years, and whose origins and content are still, as it happens, very
enigmatic, cannot, in my view, be dissociated from the emergence and
existence of this practice of counterhistory. After all, what could the
revolutionary project and the revolutionary idea possibly mean without
this preliminary interpretation of the dissymmetries, the disequilibriums,
the injustice, and the violence that function despite the order of laws,
beneath the order of laws, and through and because of the order of
laws?68
Counterhistory à la place de la concorde—before the L’Obélisque de Louxor,
before and as a condition of modern historiography, before and as a condition of
revolution. Counterhistory, moreover, revealing origins marked by conflict
61. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 119.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. at 136. With respect to royalist efforts to recolonize history, Foucault points in
particular to the establishment in 1781 of the “Bibliothèque de législation—note the terms carefully—
d’administration, histoire et droit public”—a “ministry of history” made by merging the Dépot de
chartes and the Bibliothèque de finances. Id. at 137.
64. From Coke to Spelman, to Hale, Filmer, Brady, and Burke. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 107,
120–23 (Spelman); id. at 170 – 81 (Hale); id. at 182–228 (Filmer, Brady); id. at 243 (Burke).
65. Id. at 245.
66. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 72.
67. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 245.
68. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 78 – 79. Counterhistory is endorsed more or less explicitly in
Wendy Brown’s argument for “genealogical politics,” WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY
96–134 (2001), and implicitly in Honig’s deconstruction of the standard temporal dimensions of
liberal political consciousness and her call for a “(counter)politics” attentive to “remainders.” HONIG,
supra note 20, at 141. See also id. at 10 (“[E]mergencies in the real world have a history, and one of the
requirements of political integrity . . . is surely the need to own up to our implication in the histories
by which we, at any particular moment, may feel . . . assaulted”); id. at 15, 19.
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running time out of mind—origins that cannot be reduced to any concorde.
Resistant origins.
How else are we to address resistant subjects—subjects constituted only in
scenes that might have been otherwise? And how else are resistant subjects
themselves to address the order of laws?
Yet in legal history, American legal history in any event, resistance, its
histories and historiography remain opaque. This is due in no small part to the fact
that the field has oscillated between a profound attachment to the rule of law—or
rather attachment to ideas about the rule of law which themselves oscillate
between reducing resistance to mere lawlessness and catching it up almost
immediately in reassuring narratives of legal reform—and attachment to narratives
of legal subordination in which resistance is represented either as heroic or tragic.
In neither case, it must be said, is the centered legal subject placed in doubt. We
are, in short, repeatedly tempted by our attachment to law to forget that resistance
is not something to be overcome, but rather the point of entry for modern history.
And we either blink at the underlying structures of resistance that shape American
law (most concretely the adversary system and its thoroughgoing dependence on
narrative representation, decentralized access to counsel, federalism, and
separation of powers), or we fail to recognize and interpret the operation of these
structures as structures of resistance.
Hegel was not wrong—no history without law. But from the perspective of
counterhistory, law must be detached from the desire for order and studied as a
site of resistance. We cannot save the centered subject. She lies before us, in the
first scene.

